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SUMMARY 
Founded in 1923, Walt Disney Co. has grown from a small animation studio to today’s world 
entertainment empire. The history of Disney Consumer Products (DCP) began in 1929, when Walt 
Disney first licensed the image of Mickey Mouse for use on a children’s writing tablet. DCP extends 
Disney’s brand to merchandise ranging from apparel, toys and home décor to books and magazines, foods 
and beverages, stationery, electronics and animation art. Disney consumer products are sold in Disney 
Stores and Resort Parks, and in supermarkets everywhere in the world. 
In 1995 and 1996, a number of cases of labor abuse were uncovered in Disney’s suppliers in California, 
Central America, and East Asia. In January of 1996, after a series of investigations of Disney’s suppliers 
in Haiti, the National Labor Committee released a report titled “The U.S. in Haiti: How to get rich on 11¢ 
an hour.” In the years since, Walt Disney has been widely criticized for licensing its copyrights to 
“sweatshops.” 
In response to public criticism, in 1996, Walt Disney established Code of Conduct for Manufacturers and 
started an International Labor Standards program. In 2002, Project Kaleidoscope was initiated by a 
collaborative effort of the Walt Disney Company, the McDonald’s Corporation, and seven organizations 
engaged in addressing international labor issues. With all the efforts made by Disney and labor advocacy 
groups, the overall conditions in Disney’s Chinese suppliers have been improved during the past decade. 
Yet, violations of Disney’s Code of Conduct and China Labor Law remained, especially in aspects related 
to overtime, wages, underage labor, and workers’ living conditions. Accusations and criticisms have been 
long existed around Disney’s audit system. Labor activists urge Disney to transparentize its supply chain 
and allow independent organizations and shareholders to participate in the monitoring process. 
YIUWAH ACCIDENT 
On April 17, 2009, a 17-year-old worker was crashed to death by a paper crushing machine he was 
operating. The young victim was named Liu Pan, who had worked in the factory for more than 2 years 
until he died on the job. The accident factory, Yiuwah Stationary Factory, is located in Dongguan, 
Guangdong. This Hong Kong- invested factory specializes in color printing and binding, and produces 
greeting cards, packaging, bags, notebooks, address books, paper gift boxes, stationary, books and 
publications, calendars, posters, business cards, picture frames, portrait books, and POLY handicrafts. 
Shortly after Liu Pan’s death, China Labor Watch investigated Yiuwah factory. In a report titled 
“Shattered Dreams: Underage Worker Death at Factory Supplying to Disney, Other International Brands”
 
1
, China Labor Watch noted that, “the machines are old and outdated, which can often lead to work 
injury”; “dormitory conditions are poor”; “the factory violates China’s Labor Law in terms of working 
hours, wages, and labor contracts”. Through worker interviews, the investigators found that, Liu Pan 
actually was not the youngest in his factory – during peak season, the factory hires workers who are even 
as young as 13 years old. However, regardless of age, workers all “operate” like machines day and night. 
Often times, they can take only two days off in a month.  
                                                     
1 China Labor Watch. (2009, April 30). Shattered Dreams: Underage Worker Death at Factory Supplying 
to Disney, Other International Brands. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from 
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/investigations/2009_04_30/4-29%20Liupan.pdf 
Report NO.    I00404E 
The Yiuwah accident caught public attention to the labor conditions in Chinese factories, especially those 
supplying for multinational companies, like Disney. In a New York Times article “Despite Law, Job 
Conditions Worsen in China”
2
 release in June, 2009, it was mentioned that, Disney “has called the 
situation at the factory ‘unacceptable’”, and “cease new orders of any Disney-branded products in the 
Yiuwah factory until conditions were improved.” 
DISNEY CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
Founded in 1923, Walt Disney Co. grew from a small animation studio to today’s world entertainment 
empire. The Disney Company has four major business divisions: media networks, parks and resorts, 
studio entertainment and consumer products
3
. 
The history of Disney Consumer Products (DCP) began in 1929, when Walt Disney first licensed the 
image of Mickey Mouse for use on a children’s writing tablet. DCP extends Disney’s brand to 
merchandise ranging from apparel, toys and home décor to books and magazines, foods and beverages, 
stationery, electronics and animation art
4
. Disney consumer products are sold in Disney Stores and Resort 
Parks, and in supermarkets everywhere in the world  
Each year, sales of consumer products generate a significant part of Disney’s profits. Taking 2009 as an 
example, about 2, 425 millions dollars of income was brought to Disney’s revenue by consumer products. 
However, DCP only shares a relatively small piece of pie compared with other three major segments. 
According to Disney’s financial reports from fiscal year 1997 through 2009, the annual revenue 
contribution due to DCP swung between 5%~7% from year to year. Nevertheless, benefiting from the 
affordable prices of its consumer products, Disney heroes have become more accessible to people, 
especially children from families with lower economic capacity, and Disney’s brand has been even more 
widely known all across the world.  
The majority of Disney-branded products are manufactured by licensees, managed by DCP5. According 
to Disney’s licensee application requirements (2010)
 6
, the applicant company “must be a manufacturer, 
not a middleman or distributor”. A list of numbers in Disney’s 2008 Corporate Responsibility Report 
                                                     
2 DAVID BARBOZA (2009,June 23). Despite Law, Job Conditions Worsen in China. The New York 
Times, pp.B1. 
3 Walt Disney Co. (2010). Company Overview. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from 
http://corporate.disney.go.com/index.html 




5 Walt Disney Co. (2009). Content and Products. The Walt Disney Company 2008 Corporate 
Responsibility Report. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from 
http://disney.go.com/crreport/products/consumerproducts/supplychain.html 
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illustrated the distribution of Disney’s business partners in the supply chain – the majority of Disney’s 
active vendors and licensees are located in North America (35%), Asia and Middle East (20%) excluding 
China and Japan; at the same time, Chinese factories (including Hong Kong and Macau) counted 39% of 
all the factories actively supplying Disney in 2008.  
In an article titled “From Disney to the Producers”, the Dutch “Clean Clothes” campaign
7
 pointed out 
that, Disney consumer products are usually produced in countries or in sites “where wage standards are 
very low, where labor conditions are not under control, and where it is difficult for the workers to 
organize themselves to defend their rights”. Unfortunately, the Chinese labor market seems to meet all 
these “criteria”. The sweatshop conditions in Disney’s Chinese suppliers have been “nominated” multiple 
times by medias. Meanwhile, Disney’s liabilities for poor labor conditions in its overseas supply chains 
have also concerned many labor activists as well as conscious consumers. 
“CUT AND RUN” 
In the summer of 1993, No Sweatshop Initiatives was launched by former Secretary of Labor, Robert 
Reich, to fight against the increased sweatshop manufacturing conditions both in the United States and 
abroad. A series of discussions took place in the following years in California, New York City, Chicago, 
and other regions with a large manufacturing labor force. In 1996, The Apparel Industry Partnership was 
formed by representatives of industry, unions, consumer, human rights, and religious organizations, and 
was challenged by former President Clinton to “take steps to assure that company products are made in 
compliance with acceptable labor standards, and to inform consumers that the products they buy are not 
made under exploitative conditions”8. Under this atmosphere, multinational companies were expected to 
be more conscious than ever before to take actions to eliminate human rights exploitations and to ensure 
acceptable labor standards in their global supply chain.  
During 1995 to 1996, a number of cases of labor abuse were uncovered in Disney’s suppliers in 
California, Central America, and East Asia. In January 1996, after a series of investigations of Disney’s 
suppliers in Haiti, National Labor Committee released a report “The U.S. in Haiti: How to get rich on 11¢ 
an Hour”. The report noted that workers on Disney’s production line were forced to work more than 10 
hours a day for consecutively 50 days. However, the price of Haitian workers’ hard work was as cheap as 
1 dollar a day.  
In this case, H.H. Cutler, a U.S.-based Disney licensee, subcontracted Disney orders to local Haitian 
factories. It was assumed that this was in a time when Disney still allowed its licensee to outsource the 
orders to other contractors. These Haitian local factories lying at the bottom of Disney’s supply chain 
were most likely to practice lower labor standards and violate workers’ human rights. 
After Haitian sweatshops were exposed, instead of taking any active steps to address the labor violations, 
H.H. Cutler decided to abandon its Haitian contractors, which would cause immediate layoffs for more 
than 2000 employees, in equal to one tenth of all the assembly workforce of Haiti. At the same time, 
Disney Company took a silent strategy. When requested by labor activists to use its “weight as the 
                                                     
7 Clean Clothes Campaign. (1998). From Disney to the producer. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/4-companies/917-from-disney-to-the-producer 
8 United States Department of Labour. (1997). Apparel Industry Partnership's Agreement. Retrieved 
September 21, 2010, from http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/apparell.htm 
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licensing company to pressure Cutler from not pulling out of Haiti”, Disney “categorically refused”
 910
. 
National Labor Committee criticized two companies’ “cut and run” strategies. In the same year, Disney 
established its first Code of Conduct for Manufacturers. Despite Disney’s efforts to build its first Code of 
Conduct, the company was nominated by Albion Monitor one of the “worst companies of 1996”11 for the 
widespread sweatshop conditions in its global supply chain. 
ESTABLISHMENT OF “CODE OF CONDUCT” 
In April 1997, the Workplace Code of Conduct was developed by the White House Apparel Industry 
Partnership to fight against sweatshops in the U.S. and abroad, with the hope that “consumers can have 
confidence that products that are manufactured in compliance with the standards are not produced under 
exploitative or inhumane conditions”. The Code defined a set of labor standards in the apparel industry in 
relation to forced labor, child labor, harassment or abuse, health and safety, freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, wages and benefits, hours of work, and overtime compensation.  
Shortly after the Code was formulated, Disney modified accordingly its own Code of Conduct for 
Manufacturers12. In a 1997 letter to the Dutch “Clean Clothes” Campaign regarding the concerns over 
poor working conditions in Haitian factories, vice president and managing director of Disney stated that 
Disney had developed a program that was “among the most comprehensive and sophisticated program 
among all multinational companies”13, which could be the “International Labor Standards Program” 
announced later by the Disney. In addition to these steps, as noted by National Labor Committee, Disney 
was relocating its production to China. 
PRODUCTION LINE IN CHINA 
Sweatshops in Southwest China 
Between 1998 and 2000, Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee (CIC), a faith-based organization, 
ran a series of labor investigations in Southern China covering sixteen factories supplying Disney. CIC 
released two reports based on its findings, namely“Mulan's sisters: Working for Disney is no fairy 
tale”(1999) and“BOM- Beware Of Mickey Disney sweatshops in the South China”(2000). 
                                                     
9 Jennie, B. (1996). Disney, Others Exploit Haitian Labor. Albion Monitor. Retrieved September 21, 
2010, from http://www.albionmonitor.com/1-31-96/haitilabor.html 
10 Ray. L. (1997). This Week in Haiti. Haiti Progres, 15(21): 13-19. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from 
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/43a/281.html 
11 Russell. M. (1996). The Ten Worst Corporations of 1996. Multinational Monito, 17(12). Retrieved 
September 21, 2010, from http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/mm1296.04.html 
12 Clean Clothes Campaign. (1998). From Disney to the producer. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/4-companies/917-from-disney-to-the-producer 
13 Clean Clothes Campaign. (1998). From Disney to the producer. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/4-companies/917-from-disney-to-the-producer 
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A number of violations of China’s Labor Law and Disney’s Code of Conduct were identified in these 
factories. Workers were forced to work excessive overtime, whereas their pay was far below the legal 
minimum wage standards and often times delayed. According to a worker, he and his co-workers were 
allowed to take only two days off all through the year except the annual leave during Chinese New Year. 
With minimum labor protections, workers were exposed to chemical hazards and dangerous working 
conditions. They lived in poor accommodation conditions, in which usually more than 20 people shared 
one dormitory room. Although the Code of Conduct had been established, workers were barely benefiting 
from it. Almost no worker interviewed had ever heard of Disney’s Code of Conduct or its International 
Labor Standards program.  
CIC noted that, Chinese workers were “in a very disadvantageous situation” – few of them have 
knowledge about their own legal right; they have minimum network or resources to help them defend 
their rights; they do not know how to seek help from brand companies or request international support. 
“In the face of exploitation by management, they can do nothing but tolerate it because they must keep a 
job to support their own livelihoods and those of their families.”
 14
  
In addition, several concerns were raised by CIC in its reports: 
First, instead of taking further constructive steps to address the labor issues identified by CIC, Disney 
simply stopped placing orders to three of the four factories focused in the first report. As a result, the 
workers of these three factories lost their income and were left in a worse situation. For this reason, CIC 
did not disclose the identifiable information about the later 12 factories in its second report
15
. CIC pointed 
out that as the licensing company, Disney should take responsibilities and leverage the improvement of 
labor conditions in its suppliers, rather than just “cut and run”. 
Second, apparently Disney had failed to fully implement its Code of Conduct, evidenced by the 
widespread labor violations in Disney’s suppliers. Although the Code requires manufacturers to 
communicate the code to their employees, very few workers were aware of the Code, let alone knew the 
Code was supposed to protect their rights. CIC criticized that the Code was used as a public propaganda 
by Disney, instead of a tool to ensure social compliance in its supply chain. 
Third, CIC indicated that Disney’s multi-level subcontracting system is “too complicated to monitor”. 
During CIC’s investigations, the Geneva-based quality control firm, SGS (Societe Generale de 
Surveillance), was hired by Disney to carry out audits in their Chinese toy factories. The audit procedure 
includes 4 components: 1) Disney designs a questionnaire focused on the issues of “child labor, wages, 
and safety”; 2) the auditors visit the factories with a checklist and collect data by observation and asking 
questions; 3) based on the data, the auditors evaluate the factories’ performance for each of the issues and 
decide whether the factory’s conditions are acceptable; 4) Lastly, Disney decides what to do with the 
findings. This audit activity was called by “Clean Clothes” Campaign the “company controlled or internal 
                                                     
14 Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee. (1999). Mulan's sisters, Working for Disney is no fairy 
tale. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/4-companies/910-mulans-
sisters-working-for-disney-is-no-fairy-tale 
15 Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee. (2001). Labour rights violations at 12 China factories. 
Retrieved September 21, 2010, from http://www.cleanclothes.org/news/4-companies/912-labour-rights-
violations-at-12-china-factorie 
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monitoring”
 16
. CIC urged Disney in its report to introduce an independent monitoring system and 
“disclose all information on its suppliers for public scrutiny”.  
Questions around “Auditing System” 
In September, 2005, the fifth Disneyland on the world opened in Hong Kong. In June, a labor activist 
group, Students and Scholars against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM), was formed by a group of Hong 
Kong-based students and professors. While Disney was preparing for its opening, SACOM was busy 
assigning its first investigation to Disney’s suppliers in Southern China. In August 2005, collaborating 
with National Labor Committee (NLC), SACOM published its report “Disney's Children's Books Made 
with the Blood, Sweat and Tears of Young Workers in China” 17. 
All three factories under investigation belong to a Hongkong-invested company and were situated in Pearl 
River Delta region. In addition to a number of labor violations in relation to excessive overtime, 
compulsory labor, illegal low pay, and poor living conditions, bloody accidents took place at a shockingly 
high rate in these factories. 
Some surveyed workers reported that “almost every day someone is injured”. “While producing a book 
like this ‘Mickey and Friends, Haunted Halloween’”, according to a female worker, “there are many 
chances that injuries could happen. When making this cover, we use a machine to press this edge. There 
is no safety device – all depends on your carefulness…When we put it in, if we are not careful, our 
fingers will be pressed together with this book.” The company ranked in 2004 among the top 30 factories 
in Shenzhen Industrial Area with highest number of work-related injuries. However, it is believed that the 
incidence of injuries was seriously underreported as the factories always tried to hind the numbers from 
authorities. Some workers reported that less serious injuries were simply treated in factory clinic; the 
factory would send injured workers to hospital only when serious accidents took place. 
The terrifying and sad contrast between lovely Disney animation characters and the bloody Disney 
production line gathered quite an amount of attention. Medias, including the New York Times and CNN, 
covered the bloody story as well as the criticisms raised by labor activist groups against Disney. However, 
Disney denied the accusation and responded that the company “conducts regular social compliance audits 
of the independently run factories that produce Disney branded merchandise." The company said none of 
the 20 such audits at its Chinese supplier factories since 1998 exhibited "the severity of the violations 
reported by the NLC and SACOM" 18 
However, Disney’s audit procedure was just another target of criticism. Labor activists25 believed that 
Disney’s audit system was defective. Factories usually were well informed beforehand and thus were able 
to coach their workers and prepared perfectly for the audit. In addition, as mentioned before, the 
independence and objectiveness of the so-called “company controlled”audit activities were doubtable. 
                                                     
16 Clean Clothes Campaign. (1998). Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: An Overview. 
Retrieved September 21, 2010, from http://www.cleanclothes.org/component/content/article/3-codes-of-
conduct/574-codes-of-conduct-for-transnational-corporations-an-overview 
17 National Labor Committee & SACOM. (2005). Disney’s Children’s Books: Made with the Blood, 
Sweat and Tears of Young Workers in China. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from http://www.ci-
romero.de/fileadmin/download/cora/sacom_national_labor_committee_2005_disneys_childrens_books.pd
f 
18 Roben.F.(2005). Group calls Disney site sweatshop. The New York Times. Retrieved September 21, 
2010, from http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/19/business/worldbusiness/19iht-disney.html 
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Similar like what CIC requested years ago, SACOM and National Labor Committee addressed an open 
letter25 to Disney Company and stated that Disney should disclose its Chinese factories information to 
allow other independent organizations to monitor the factories’ compliance to labor standards, that Disney 
should allow labor rights and human rights organizations to deliver training to workers in order to raise 
workers’ awareness of their rights. 
Since 2006, Disney started to work with Verite to audit Disney’s suppliers in China
27
. Verite is a non-
profit organization based in Amberst, Massachusetts, which monitors international labor conditions in 
multinational corporate supply chain. A representative of Verite’s Shenzhen office disclosed that 
“normally when Disney gives Verite a factory to audit, it is because it has failed a previous audit.”
 19
 In 
this sense, it is possible that factories which have passed the audit by coaching the workers and lying to 
the auditors are less likely to be monitored by Verite, and thus, the labor issues lied in those factories 
remain under the radar.  
NEW EFFORTS: PROJECT KALEIDOSCOPE 
In 2002, Project Kaleidoscope was initiated by a collaborative effort of the Walt Disney Company, the 
McDonald’s Corporation, and seven organizations engaged in addressing international labor issues. 
Disney and its project partners were hoping to facilitate the internal communications within factories by 
engaging “key stakeholders, including workers and supervisors, as well as managers, in collaborative 
efforts to identify issues, develop solutions and monitor progress”20. The project formulated a set of 
compliance guidelines to serve as a “uniform code” based on Disney and the McDonald’s codes of 
conduct. In addition, a self-assessment tool and audit tool were developed as a part of the systems-based 
approach. Ten factories in Southern China producing apparel, footwear, toys, and other promotional items 
were selected to pilot the project. All the factories produced for both Disney licensees and McDonald’s 
restaurants. The project was aimed to form a new compliance approach to “develop factory-based systems 
that can further pinpoint the source of recurring compliance issues with the objective of resolving and 
preventing them from recurring”
 21
. 
In February, 2005, shortly after the interim report was released, Disney held its annual board meeting in 
Minnesota. A shareholder resolution titled “China and Labor Standards” was introduced by the Office of 
the Comptroller of New York City. The proposal pointed out that a number of violations of Disney’s 
corporate code of conduct had been revealed by labor advocacy groups in factories supplying products for 
Disney, and a large majority of workers surveyed at those supplier factories were unaware of the 
corporate code of conduct of Disney. These labor issues would lead to “negative publicity, public protests 
and a loss of consumer confidence”, which could have a “negative impact on shareholder value”. The 
                                                     
19 China.Org.Cn.(2009). Campaigners keep up pressure in Disney child labor storm. Retrieved September 
21, 2010, from http://www.china.org.cn/china/news/2009-08/14/content_18335073.htm 
20 Project Kaleidoscope.(2008). Executive Summary. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from 
http://www.asyousow.org/human_rights/docs/Project%20K%20summary.pdf 
21 Project Kaleidoscope.(2008). Final Report. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from 
http://www.asyousow.org/human_rights/docs/ProjectKaleidoscope-final-report2008.pdf 
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resolution requested that Disney’s Board of Directors should review these issues and report to 
shareholders by September 200522.  
However, the Disney Board of Directors recommended that shareholders vote No on the resolution. The 
matter was left unsettled.  
The final report of Project Kaleidoscope was released in 2008. It pointed out the limits of conventional 
audits: first, conventional audits can only reflect facility conditions at a particular point in time; second, as 
negative findings from audits are “linked to potential loss of business”, factory management often times 
only focus on “securing passing scores” rather than “identifying opportunities for improvement”. The 
report then remarked that conventional audits alone cannot systematically address labor issues, and that 
“sustainable solutions to systemic issues require something different”. It was concluded at the end of the 
report that factories participating in Project kaleidoscope have “expanded and/or improved their systems 
for communicating with workers and receiving feedback”; “between 78% and nearly 100% of workers 
surveyed said conditions in their factories had improved since the systems-based approach was 
implemented”, especially in aspects such as “timely pay, good treatment by supervisors, congenial living 
environments”; in addition, the factories also “see value in actively managing the compliance process”, 




Henry Merton – A Case of a Kaleidoscope Factory 
Henry Merton is a Hong Kong-invested company and a major plastic toy producer in Dongguan. Its 
customers include Walt Disney, McDonalds, and other multinational brands. In 2002, the two brand 
companies with other organizations initiated Project Kaleidoscope to facilitate the improvement of labor 
conditions in their global supply chain. Merton was selected as one of the 10 pilot factories for the project 
Since 1998, China Labor Watch has followed the labor conditions in Merton factories in Southern China. 
A 2001 report revealed a variety of labor violations in Merton factories – workers were required to work 
underpaid overtime, regularly lasting through the night; the workers were kept working 120 consecutive 
workdays without rest while being paid at illegally low rate; they had to keep themselves very “well-
behaved” to prevent various penalties set by the factories; the dormitory rooms were very poor and 
usually 20 people had to crowd in one room; workers had few ideas about their legal rights; when workers 
signed the labor contracts with the factories, they were not explained or provided with a copy of the 
contract; workers were coached and threatened to lie to the auditors and authorities, and so on. It is easy 
for people to associate these findings to sweatshops conditions. Nevertheless, Merton was one of the best 
factories in Disney’s supply chain（2009）. 
Four years after Kaleidoscope's launch, CLW returned to Merton after a major protest in 2006 involving 
nearly a thousand workers, numerous injuries and arrests. In a CLW follow-up investigation, many of the 
same wage, working hour and safety violations from the 2000 report persisted. Disney and Merton’s other 
major customers refuted CLW's investigation stating that the strikes were merely caused by a “disgruntled 
                                                     
22 National Labor Committee & SACOM. (2005). Disney’s Children’s Books: Made with the Blood, 
Sweat and Tears of Young Workers in China. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from http://www.ci-
romero.de/fileadmin/download/cora/sacom_national_labor_committee_2005_disneys_childrens_books.pd
f 
23 Project Kaleidoscope.(2008). Final Report. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from 
http://www.asyousow.org/human_rights/docs/ProjectKaleidoscope-final-report2008.pdf 
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worker”. Rather than explaining how Kaleidoscope was enabling changes at Merton, its customers denied 
the existence of serious problems that need to be fixed（2009）. 
In a report issued in 2009 after the implementation of the Project Kaleidoscope, China Labor Watch noted 
that many of the worst violations that led to Merton's long history of worker strikes have been addressed. 
However, the violations of Disney’s Code of Conduct and China Labor Law remained in aspect of 
overtime, wages, underage labor, and workers’ living conditions. 
China Labor Watch pointed out that the systematic failure of Disney's auditing force allows the company 
to produce toys and other products in sweatshop conditions, defend itself with flawed audits, and address 
serious problems only when called upon to act by external allegations.  
（See Appendix I for a comparison of findings from investigations conducted by China Labor Watch 
between 1998~2009.） 
DISNEY CEASED ORDERS FROM YIUWAH 
On May 7th, 2009, right after the Yiuwah accident, China Labor Watch addressed an open letter24 to the 
president of Disney, Robert A. Iger. CLW stated that although the factory had been gone through multiple 
audits by Disney, the serious labor violations had not been remedied, which indicated that Disney’s audits 
were defective to identify the reoccurring labor violations. Disney should address this systematic problem 
to prevent other young workers, like Liu Pan, from being exposed to dangerous and hazard working 
conditions.  
In response25 to China Labor Watch, Disney stated that they were in discussion with licensees, vendors 
and Yiuwah factory to find out an “effective and sustainable” solution to address the labor issues 
identified in Yiuwah. In terms of the issues of audit system corruption, Disney did not give direct answer. 
Rather, the company emphasized on its corporation with independent labor monitoring organizations 
including Verite and CREA. In addition, Disney noted that similar labor issues were arising in factories 
both within and outside of China, particularly in factories that “are not often owned by Disney licensees 
and vendors, are geographically distant, and produce for a number of brands and retailers”.  
The statement made by Disney indicated: 1) labor violations are widespread in multinational corporate 
supply chains in China and many other areas, and conditions identified in Disney’s suppliers are not the 
only cases; 2) because many problem factories produce for several brands at the same time and due to 
distant geographic locations, Disney has very limited influence on these factories.  
In the Disney Customer Products licensee application instructions, Disney requires that the eligible 
company “must be a manufacturer, not a middleman or distributor”; Disney’s Code of Conduct also 
requires that the licensee must use subcontractors for the manufacture of Disney products, the licensee 
must get a written authorization from Disney Company and the subcontractor also should “enter into a 
                                                     
24 China Labor Watch.(2009, May 7). An Open Letter to Disney. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from 
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/investigations/2009_08_05/CLW%20letter%20to%20Disney%20CEO.p
df 
25 Walt Disney Co. (2009, May 21). A Letter to China Labor Watch. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from 
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/investigations/2009_08_05/Disney%20Letter.pdf 
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written commitment with Disney to comply it Code of Conduct”. Apparently, Disney has not been able to 
enforce its influence on manufacturers through these criteria or regulations.  
In Disney Corporate Responsibility Report of 2008, the company explained its multi-level supply chain 
system, which includes licensees and vendors on the second layer, agents, sub-vendors, and distributors 
on the third layer, and factories and workers at the bottom of the supply chain. Disney stated that the 
“selection of the factories is a key component of” each licensee’s and vendor’s “business operations”, that 
Disney only has “some influence” on the business entities, like the factories, that they work indirectly26.  
Within one month after Disney promised to work on Yiuwah’s issues, the company announced on June 
17, 2009, that it would cease new orders of any Disney-branded products in the Yiuwah factory until 
conditions were improved27. China Labor Watch then allied with the France-based Peuples Solidaires in 
an open letter campaign pressuring Disney to make changes to the factory, and face public outcry, which 
then generated thousands letters from consumers and shareholders to Disney. Under this pressure, Disney 
released a letter on July 30 outlining a number of changes it would implement at Yiuwah. 
DISNEY’S SUPPLY CHAIN AND WORKERS’ FUTURE 
The page of Yiuwah accident has turned over. However, related discussions and efforts made to protect 
workers’ rights are continuing. In the past decade, the accusations and criticisms have been long existed 
around Disney’s audit system. China Labor Watch suspected that Disney’s audit system is corrupted and 
urged Disney to disclose its list of auditing companies. Requests were also made repeatedly by labor 
activist that Disney should make factory information accessible to allow independent organizations and 
shareholders to participate in the monitoring process. Yet, Disney has not taken any meaningful steps to 
improve the transparency of its supply chain. Disney says, “In our contracts with licensees and vendors, 
many of them have required us to agree to keep their factory sources confidential”. 
In August, 2010, China Labor Watch ran an investigation of two factories supplying for Disney. 
The “historical issues” remain: 
Underage and child labor are widespread in the factories. These young workers work as many 
hours as their adult counterparts; 
Averagely, weekly working time exceeds 72 hours. The workers are required to work overtime as 
many as 130 hours a month, while they can usually take one day off each month; 
The overtime compensation is as low as 97 centers/hour, far below the legal standard; 
Workers are not provided the minimum social insurance required by law; 
Long-term exposure to chemical hazards has led to a running nose, dry lips, rashes, among other 
allergy symptoms. The factory took a stand-by strategy without providing education, adequate labor 
protection or physical examinations to the workers.  
 This reminds us again of Disney’s Code of Conduct for Manufacturers: 
                                                     
26 Walt Disney Co. (2009). The Walt Disney Company 2008 Corporate Responsibility Report. Retrieved 
September 21, 2010, from http://corporate.disney.go.com/files/FINAL_Disney_CR_Report_2008.pdf 
27 China Labor Watch.(2009, May 7). An Open Letter to Disney. Retrieved September 21, 2010, from 
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/investigations/2009_08_05/7-1%20CLW%20letter%20to%20Disney.pdf 
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 Child Labor - Manufacturers will not use child labor. The term “child” refers to a person 
younger than 15 (or 14 where local law allows) or, if higher, the local legal minimum age for employment 
or the age for completing compulsory education. 
Manufacturers employing young persons who do not fall within the definition of “children” will also 
comply with any laws and regulations applicable to such persons. 
Health and Safety - Manufacturers will provide employees with a safe and healthy workplace 
in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, ensuring at a minimum reasonable access to 
potable water and sanitary facilities; fire safety; and adequate lighting and ventilation. Manufacturers will 
also ensure that the same standards of health and safety are applied in any housing that they provide for 
employees. 
 Compensation - We expect manufacturers to recognize that wages are essential to meeting 
employees’ basic needs. Manufacturers will, at a minimum, comply with all applicable wage and 
hour laws and regulations, including those relating to minimum wages, overtime, maximum hours, 
piece rates and other elements of compensation, and provide legally mandated benefits. Except in 
extraordinary business circumstances, manufacturers will not require employees to work more than 
the lesser of (a) 48 hours per week and 12 hours overtime or (b) the limits on regular and overtime 
hours allowed by local law or, where local law does not limit the hours of work, the regular work 
week plus 12 hours overtime. In addition, except in extraordinary business circumstances, employees 
will be entitled to at least one day off in every seven-day period. 
 Manufacturers will compensate employees for overtime hours at such premium rate as is 
legally required or, if there is no legally prescribed premium rate, at a rate at least equal to the regular 
hourly compensation rate. 
An investigator wrote the following words in her dairy: 
“Whenever the machines were operating, some of the workers must be ready to work. They are affiliating 
with machines, just like a screw. The workers, especially those who look fresh and young, have no choice 
but to exchange the best time of their life for a job to support their own livelihoods. After this peak 
season, some of them might be moving forward to find a job in another factory. Would their future also 
lie in the next factory as well? 
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Labor 
Issues 1998~2000 2006 2009 
Violations of 
Disney’s Code of 
Conduct 
Recruitmen
t and hiring 
  The factory will hire any 
female but selection for 
males is stricter; 
Nondiscrimination
; Child Labor 
  There are a large number of 
underage workers (school 
workers) in the factory. 
Labor 
contracts 
In order to deal with the 
inspections by the 
authorities, the factory 
signs fake contracts with 
workers; 
 The labor contract is signed 
3 months after hiring; 
Other Laws 
Only the boss has the 
copy of signed contract. 
 Both the factory and the 





Each day, workers work 
about 12.5~14hours;  
Only the three-hour night 
shift is counted as 
overtime work; 
Each day, workers 
work about 11 
hours; overtime 
hours go up to 70 
hours/month; 
The factory is on a 
6day/week, 6 hour and 40 
minute/day system;  
Each day, workers work 
about 11.5 hours; Working 
time after 3:30 pm is 
considered overtime;  
The first 6 hours and 40 
minutes on Saturdays counts 
as regular working hours;  




One day off each month 
if there is no production 
deadline; many workers 
have to work 120 days 
consecutively before 
getting one day off; 
 Workers take Sunday off. 
Workers have to work 
overtime; those not 
working overtime are 
considered absent from 
work, and will be fined 
49 RMB on each 
occasion; 
Overtime is required 
and those refusing to 
work overtime are 
subject to salary 
deductions; 
Overtime is generally 
voluntary; 
APPENDIX 1：HENRY MERTON LABOR CONDITIONS FROM 1998 TO 2009 
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Workers are paid on 
product count; 
After all kinds of 
deductions, the average 
monthly pay is below 400 
RMB. 
Workers are paid 
minimum wage in 
Dongguan; 
No base pay for 
workers who get 
piece rate. 
Regular workers are paid 
770 RMB ($113) base 
wages/month; 
No overtime pay. No overtime pay. Regular overtime wages are 
1.5 times normal wages, 
weekend overtime is 2 times 
and holiday overtime is 3 
times 
Wages of the first 40 days 
are held up as deposits. 









Workers have to wear 
uniforms and pay out of 
their own pockets to buy 
the uniforms; if the 
workers lose the uniform 
or do not return the 
uniform when they quit, a 
deduction will be made 
from their wages; 
Gloves or masks are not 
provided to workers; 
 Workers are required to 
wear uniforms and hats at 
work; 
Heath and Safety 
The fume in the spraying 
department is very strong, 
but the workers are never 
explained the safety 
hazards with paints; 
 Workers in the Assembly 
Department are not protected 
when using super glues that 
harm their skin; Although 
required, earplugs are not 
provided to the machine 
operators working under an 
ear piercing noise; Workers 
feel the plastic smell is very 
strong in the Fuel Injection 
Department, even after 
wearing masks; 
Factory clinic is 
accessible, but the 
medical expenses are 
deducted from workers’ 
wages. 
 First aid kits are locked, thus 
are not accessible to the 
workers 





Each month, 111 RMB is 
deduced for living 
expenses, water and 
electricity bills, and 
miscellaneous fees, from 
workers’ monthly pay; 
Each month, 
workers must pay 
250 RMB (31.25) 
for room and board;  
The factory adds 250 RMB 
($37)/month to each 
workers’ dining card; 
Health and Safety 
Food is not enough for 
workers and many 
workers are left hungry; 
 Workers all feel the food 
smells badly; 
Each dormitory room 
houses at least 17 
workers; 
 Most dorm rooms house 10 
workers; 
Drinking water is not 
provided; 
In winter, they have 
enough hot water for 
shower, but hot water is 
not available after 
23:30pm. 
 No hot water to shower or 






Workers are paid 25 
RMB as bonus if they do 
not take any leave in a 
month; 
 The perfect attendance 
bonus is given when workers 
are not absent and do not ask 
for time off for one month; 
 
Workers are loosely 
fined, or even fired for 
various reasons. 
 If workers make mistakes, 





If workers quit, they 
cannot get back the 
deposit which is the 40 
days’ wages. 
 Turnover is high, and 40~50 




Workers do not get paid 
on the day they take 
leave. 
 It is hard to resign. 
Benefits   Pregnant women get three 
months of paid vacation; 
Other Laws 
  No annual vacation; 
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2001 Report is available at 
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/investigations/2001_11_01/index.php 
2006 Report is available at 
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/investigations/2006_07_27/index.php 
2009 Report is available at 
http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/investigations/2009_11_17/20091029merton.php
 The factory dose not 
provide workers 
with adequate 
insurance; half of 
the workers have 
work injury 
insurance, which is 
required by law to 
be provided to all 
workers. 
The factory does not buy 
insurance for workers in the 
probationary period; 
After the probationary 
period, workers must apply 




Workers don’t know if 
the factory has a union. 
   
Others Workers are required to 
lie to the inspectors and 
auditors. 
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